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Abstract 
Background: Patients receiving palliative care are vulnerable to patient safety incidents but little is 
known about the extent of harm caused or the origins of unsafe care in this population.  
Aim: To quantify and qualitatively analyse serious incident reports in order to understand the causes 
and impact of unsafe care in a population receiving palliative care. 
Setting and participants: ‘epoƌts to a ŶatioŶal dataďase of ͞seƌious iŶĐideŶts ƌeƋuiƌiŶg 
iŶǀestigatioŶ͟ iŶǀolǀiŶg patieŶts ƌeĐeiving palliative care in the National Health Service (NHS) in 
England during the twelve year period, April 2002 to March 2014. 
Design: A mixed methods approach was used. Following quantification of type of incidents and their 
location, a qualitative analysis using a modified framework method was used to interpret themes in 
reports to examine underlying causes and the nature of resultant harms.  
Results: A total of 475 reports were identified: 266 related to pressure ulcers, 91 to medication 
errors, 46 to falls, 21 to healthcare associated infections (HCAIs), 18 were other instances of 
disturbed dying, 14 were allegations against health professions, 8 transfer incidents, 6 suicides and 
five other concerns.  The frequency of report types differed according to the care setting. Underlying 
causes included lack of palliative care experience, under-resourcing and poor service coordination. 
Resultant harms included worsened symptoms, disrupted dying, serious injury and hastened death.  
Conclusions: Unsafe care presents a risk of significant harm to patients receiving palliative care. 
Improvements in the coordination of care delivery alongside wider availability of specialist palliative 
care support may reduce this risk. 
Keywords: Patient safety, Palliative Care, Palliative Medicine, Medical errors, Risk management, 
Qualitative research  
 
What is already known about the topic?  
 Patients receiving palliative care are vulnerable to inadvertent harm during the course of 
their medical and nursing care, with some risks specific to this patient population. 
 Previously, no studies have examined the nature and sources of inadvertent harm in a 
population of patient receiving palliative care across a healthcare system. 
What this paper adds  
 Patients receiving palliative care are at risk of harm due to shortfalls in their care, this harm 
manifests as worsened symptoms, serious injury and hastened or disrupted death. 
 Factors underlying harm include a lack of palliative care experience, under-resourcing of 
health services and poor service coordination. 
Implications for practice, theory or policy 
 Better coordination of the delivery of palliative care and wider availability of specialist 
palliative care advice and support may make care safer.   
Introduction 
Avoidable harm during the course of healthcare provision has been shown to be an important 
source of mortality and morbidity worldwide.1-2 The realisation of the scale of the human and 
financial costs resulting from this preventable harm has led to the growth of the discipline of patient 
safetǇ, ǁhiĐh ĐaŶ ďe defiŶed as ͞the prevention of avoidable errors and adverse effects to patients 
associated with health care͟.3  Palliative care is not immune to these risks; the use of strong opioids 
and sedatives,4 care outside specialist settings,5 reliance on informal carers6 and promoting patient 
choice7 all contribute to the risk of adverse events occurring. The fragile physical, psychological, 
social and spiritual state of palliative care patients reduces their resilience to unsafe care7-10 and it is 
also apparent that the changing goals of therapy towards the end of life may create conflicts with 
measures to prevent adverse events such as pressure sores and falls that are considered standard in 
other areas of healthcare.3 When asked about patient safety, patients receiving palliative care 
identify specific risks with poor communication, hastened death and the failure to provide a good 
death identified as potential harms.8,11-15  
 
Previous studies of patients with progressive and life-limiting illness have documented specific risks 
towards the end of life.16 Pressure ulcers affect a quarter of patients receiving hospice care.17-19 
Suicide is a heightened risk in patients receiving palliative care.20-21 The use of opioids22 and syringe-
drivers to deliver medication can result in harm.23 However, health system-wide studies of patient 
safety incidents or opportunities to improve safety in the delivery of palliative care are uncommon24 
and attempts to quantify and qualify the burden of unsafe care in palliative populations have been 
unsatisfactory, even when focussed on a specific type of risk.25 
 
The aims of this study were to quantify and qualitatively analyse serious incident reports from a 
national database in order to understand the causes and impact of unsafe care in a population 
receiving palliative care, including the underlying system factors as well as the more obvious 
immediate human factors.26 Our findings provide insights into the nature and causes of inadvertent 
harm to this vulnerable patient population and offer a foundation for building safer care.  
In the United Kingdom context, and hence this study: 
 ͞HospiĐe͟ ƌefeƌs to iŶstitutioŶs, usuallǇ pƌedoŵiŶaŶtlǇ ĐhaƌitǇ-funded, that provide 
inpatient and outpatient palliative care including day therapy and home-based community 
services. 
 Palliative medicine exists as a distinct medical specialty. Whilst we recognise that many 
clinicians will provide some palliation, we defined specialist palliative care as the 
involvement of clinicians with specialist training in, and working predominantly or 
exclusively in palliative care. 
 
Methods 
We conducted a mixed-methods analysis of reports of serious patient safety incidents from a 
database of all such incidents relating to patients treated in the National Health Service (NHS) in 
England during the period 2002 to 2014. The need for ethical approval was waived by the Cardiff 
UŶiǀeƌsitǇ “Đhool of MediĐiŶe͛s ‘eseaƌĐh EthiĐs Coŵŵittee ;“MREC Ref 16/59, Nov 2016). 
Data source 
Since 2002, hospitals and other NHS organisations in England have been required to record, report, 
and investigate any serious incident requiring investigation (SIRI).27-28 The resulting database, the 
Strategic Executive Information System (STEIS), is the source of our study population. Each report in 
STEIS contains categorical information and free-text commentary. The categorical information 
covers: administrative data, the care sector and clinical area involved, the location of the incident 
and the type of incident. Free text fields record what occurred, what immediate action was taken 
and a summary of the case although the detail contained is highly variable with some fields being 
left blank. The reporting organisation is later expected to complete further free-text fields detailing 
the investigation carried out, root causes identified, and lessons learned following the incident, 
again these fields can be left blank. STEIS had accumulated over 120,000 reports by April 2014 
(further information on STEIS is available in the online appendix).  
Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
The database was searched to extract reports that had been filed with any of the following criteria: 
͚HospiĐe͛ as LoĐatioŶ of iŶĐideŶt, ͚Palliatiǀe MediĐiŶe͛ as CliŶiĐal aƌea oƌ ĐoŶtaiŶed aŶǇ of the teƌŵs 
͚palliat*͛, ͚teƌŵiŶal͛, ͚hospiĐe͛, ͚eŶd-of-life͛ oƌ ͚Đaƌe pathǁaǇ͛.  The folloǁiŶg Đƌiteƌia ǁeƌe applied to 
extracted reports (Figure 1). Criteria for inclusion (any of): a) care provided in a hospice inpatient 
unit; b) care provided by a specialist palliative medicine team; c) a clear statement of a decision to 
treat with palliative (as opposed to life-prolonging) intent prior to the incident occurring. The criteria 
for exclusion were: a) reports where a patient was receiving treatment delivered with palliative 
rather than curative intent and the incident related solely to disease-modifying treatment (e.g. 
chemotherapy drug errors); b) the event reported occurred prior to a decision to treat with palliative 
intent (e.g. a patient who fell in hospital, sustained a severe head injury and was given palliative care 
from that point onwards); c) incidents not related to patient care (e.g. statutory reporting of deaths 
in state facilities such as prisons). We included all reports related to patient care, regardless of 
whether the events described appeared to contain a safety incident in order to capture the breadth 
of concerns triggering reporting from frontline clinical practice. Reports were allocated a unique 
identifier with four letters related to the location the report arose from (Hosp = Hospice inpatient 
unit, Acut= Acute hospital, Comm = Community hospital, Nurs = Nursing or care home, Home = 
PatieŶt͛s oǁŶ hoŵeͿ and a non-consecutive number. 
Data analysis 
Two concurrent forms of analysis were employed: All reports were included in a descriptive 
quantitative analysis of the nature and location of the incident. Where reports contained sufficient 
detail, the verbatim free text fields were analysed qualitatively using a modified Framework 
Method.29-31 We applied the method combining deductive and inductive approaches32 through the 
five steps in Table 1. Further details are available in the online appendix.  
Results 
Altogether, 475 unique reports fulfilling our inclusion criteria were identified. Figure 1 shows how 
the study population was derived from the main database. 78 (16%) reports were excluded from the 
qualitative analysis because they lacked sufficient detail in the free text sections. Overall, 423 (89%) 
of the reports included in the study were in one of five categories: pressure ulcer development or 
worsening, medication errors for end of life drugs, falls, healthcare associated infections, and 
disturbed dying. Pressure ulcers alone accounted for 266 (56%) reports. Shortfalls in care fell into 
fiǀe theŵes: Caƌe plaŶŶiŶg, ǁheƌe the laĐk of oƌ failuƌes iŶ, the plaŶ foƌ a patieŶt͛s Đaƌe Đaused 
harm, for example where an absence of anticipatory prescribing led to poor symptom control. 
Individual care-giver, where shortfalls in care were directly attributable to an individual, for example 
drug prescribing or administration errors. Communication, where poor communication led to harm, 
for example a failure of communication with relatives.  Care coordination and delivery, where the 
systems in which care was provided did not function properly and led to harm, for example poor 
handover between care providers causing disruptions in care. Equipment, where a specific item of 
equipment, or the lack of equipment, was implicated in causing harm, for example the malfunction 
of a syringe driver. 
 
There was variation in the type of report from different locations. Medication errors and allegations 
against health professionals were more likely to occur during care at home than in any other 
environment, falls were disproportionately reported from hospice settings and healthcare 
associated infections from acute settings (Table 2). Patterns emerged linking types of incident with 
shortfalls in standards of care in different care settings and different underlying contextual factors. 
These themes are presented, considering each incident type in turn.  
Pressure ulcers  
All the reports involving pressure ulcers were made after the regulator of healthcare in England (the 
Care Quality Commission) established mandatory reporting of this outcome of care. Of the 266 
reports of pressure ulcers from the qualitative analysis, 65 were excluded because the free text 
sections of the report were incomplete. In 136 (68%) of the 201 reports of pressure ulcers analysed, 
no shortfall in the standard of care was identified. In some, it was clear that the nature of the 
patieŶt͛s ĐoŶditioŶ ŵade the deǀelopŵeŶt of pƌessuƌe ulĐeƌs uŶaǀoidaďle despite ŵaǆiŵal pƌessuƌe 
relief therapy, for example this case in a terminally ill elderly lady who was being cared for in a 
hospice: 
͞This case is an example of the physiological changes that are commonly seen during the last 
weeks of life. It highlights the difficulties in pressure ulcer prevention despite appropriate risk 
assessment and care planning being undertaken.͛͛ Hosp25 
In other cases where pressure damage resulted despite appropriate care, a decision not to apply 
pressure-relieving care aligned with patient goals, for example: 
͞Discussed possibility of having profiling bed and superior mattress but patient wants to 
spend remaining time in her own double bed to be close to her husband.͟ Home16 
A decision to alter the care plan to respond to the wishes of a patient appeared in 100 reports; of 
these 85 (85%) had received specialist palliative care input.  
 
When shortfalls in standards of care were identified in reports of pressure ulcers, this often resulted 
from uncertainty about what was appropriate for palliative care. This was most apparent in acute 
hospitals and in nursing homes amongst non-specialist palliative care clinical staff (medical and 
nursing), for example: 
͞Early liaison with the tissue viability nurse … is not implemented when patient is on the end 
of life tool. Discuss with palliative care regarding review of end-of-life toolkit to include when 
it is appƌopƌiate aŶd hoǁ fƌeƋueŶtlǇ assessŵeŶt should ďe doŶe.͟ Acut25 
Among patients cared for in their own home, the unavailability of pressure relieving equipment was 
the principal factor in the development of pressure ulcers in 14 (48%) of 29 cases; for example: 
͞…a fax was received stating that no mattress was available…the patient developed a grade 
3 pressure ulcer whilst awaiting delivery of mattress. An 8 day delay in the delivery of 
essential equipment…ĐoŶtƌiďuted to a fuƌtheƌ ďƌeakdoǁŶ iŶ the pƌessuƌe ulĐeƌ͟ Home70 
 
Medication errors  
Of the 86 medication errors analysed, 76 (88%) exclusively involved the use of opioids or sedatives 
and half (43, 50%) were when non-palliative care specialists provided care. Comparison of the 
quantitative data analysis with our qualitative themes showed that shortfalls were concentrated in 
the theme of Individual caregiver followed by Care coordination and delivery. This was usually due to 
medication being unavailable (not prescribed, difficult to access supply, lack of professionals to 
administer) to patients being cared for in their own homes (not reported from any other sites). 
 
Errors in medicine prescription (38 (44%) cases) and medicine administration (19 (22%) cases) were 
the commonest shortfalls in standards of care across all settings; for example:  
͞PƌesĐƌiďiŶg eƌƌoƌ oĐĐuƌƌed ǁheŶ geŶeƌal pƌaĐtitioŶeƌ iŶĐoƌƌeĐtlǇ ĐoŶǀeƌted oƌal ŵoƌphiŶe to 
diamorphine for a syringe driver. Three times recommended dosage was prescribed…. 
Patient was administered the syringe driver and became drowsy, so duty nurse contacted 
duty doctor and it was identified that incorrect dose had been prescribed. Ambulance called 
and patient was admitted to hospital.͟ Home86 
 
Confusion in the selection of, or conversion between, different opioids occurred in medication 
administration as well as prescription, as here: 
͞TheǇ should haǀe giǀeŶ Ϭ.ϭϱŵg of AlfeŶtaŶǇl ϭŵg/Ϯŵl iŶstead theǇ adŵiŶisteƌed 0.30ml of 
AlfeŶtaŶǇl ϱŵg iŶ ϭŵl͟ Comm25 
 
The patieŶt͛s oǁŶ hoŵe ǁas the loĐatioŶ of Đaƌe iŶ a dispƌopoƌtioŶate Ŷuŵďeƌ ;52, 60%) of reports 
of medication errors. Of these 52, only two (4%) described errors by non-professional care-givers. 
Syringe drivers were implicated in 23 (27%) medication errors. All but three were due to errors in the 
set-up and use of the driver; for example: 
͞EǀeŶiŶg “eƌǀiĐe aƌƌiǀed at ϮϬ.ϭϬ, sǇƌiŶge dƌiǀeƌ ďaƌƌel eŵptǇ aŶd it ǁas Ŷoted that ƌate had 
been set incorrectly…Staff Member B changed rate of administration of the MS16A believing 
it was the same device as the MS26͟ Home47 
The risk of a lack of understanding of different models of syringe driver arose when either patients 
or staff moved between organisations using different drivers. Errors in the use of syringe drivers 
mostly resulted in overdoses of medication although on two occasions a syringe driver failed to 
deliǀeƌ adeƋuate dosiŶg, leadiŶg to a ǁoƌseŶiŶg of the patieŶt͛s sǇŵptoŵs. 
 
Where harm was reported, it disrupted patient care by causing an unplanned readmission to 
hospital (seven cases) and worsened symptom management (19 cases). Many medication errors 
were close to the moment of death; for example: 
͞The patient was prescribed 5mg Morphine Sulphate subcutaneously. The nurse 
administered 5 mg Diamorphine in error. The medication was administered at 08.45hrs. The 
patieŶt died at ϭϬ.Ϭ7hƌs.͟ Comm13 
 
In 23 (27%) instances the incident report recorded concerns that medications had hastened the 
death of the patieŶt, aŶd iŶ thƌee iŶstaŶĐes these ĐoŶĐeƌŶs Đaŵe fƌoŵ the patieŶts͛ faŵilies. For 
example; 
͞Registered Nurse administered inappropriate prescription dose of midazolam. Patient died 
ϭϰ houƌs lateƌ… informed [local] Police and Coroners Officer͟ Home96 
In all but four of these 23 cases, a referral to the coroner was mentioned in the report. 
 
Falls 
Falls were the third most frequent category of report with 39 instances. Inadequate staffing was the 
most commonly identified shortfall in standard of care (18 cases, 46%). Overall, 29 (74%) of the falls 
resulted in an injury, most commonly fractured neck of femur or intra-cranial haemorrhage. In five 
cases, a decision was made not to investigate possible injuries; for example:  
͞On examination it was felt that she might have fractured her hip. In discussion with her 
family I, as the consultant, decided that the best course of action was to keep her in the 
hospice and treat her conservatively with bed rest and analgesia…The following day she 
died.͟ Hosp12 
These five cases were all in a hospice setting. In 14 other cases, the fall led to an unplanned 
admission to an acute hospital for treatment; for example: 
͞PatieŶt ǁas tƌaŶspoƌted to the aĐute hospital ǁheƌe it has ďeeŶ ĐoŶfiƌŵed that the patieŶt 
has a fraĐtuƌe of the left hip aŶd ǁill ƌeƋuiƌe suƌgeƌǇ.͟ Hosp68 
In twelve cases the fall was considered to have hastened the death of the patient and a referral to 
the coroner was made in eleven, as described later. 
 
Healthcare associated infections  
Twenty-one reports concerning healthcare associated infections were included, all related to 
methicillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) or Clostridium difficile (C. difficile) infections. In 
all but three (14%) the incident appeared to be unavoidable due to contextual factors such as the 
patieŶts͛ oǀeƌall ĐliŶiĐal ĐoŶditioŶ. DelaǇs iŶ the diagŶosis aŶd ŵaŶageŵeŶt of C. diffiĐile iŶfeĐtioŶ 
were identified in the other three cases: this was caused by misdiagnosis following an assumption 
that symptoms were due to underlying disease or side effects from medication rather than a 
reversible infective cause; for example: 
͞Admitted to [hospice] due to uncontrolled pain, confusion and diarrhoea. … Impression was 
that the patient had overflow diarrhoea secondary to opiate constipation… The Cdifficile 
toxin positive result was communicated [fiǀe daǇs lateƌ]͟ Hosp05 
C. difficile infection caused worsened symptom control in six cases and was reported to have 
hastened the death of ten patients. 
 
Allegations against health professionals 
Allegations of unprofessional nursing behaviour (five cases) and of acceleration of death (6 cases, 
three regarding general practitioners and three nursing staff) occurred across settings. For example: 
͞OǀeƌŶight faŵilǇ Đlaiŵ that patient was left in pain with no adequate pain relief. Also 
complain that the nursing staff lacked compassion. They believe that the patient died 
͞ǁƌithiŶg iŶ paiŶ aŶd agoŶǇ aŶd that the Ŷuƌses did Ŷot do aŶǇthiŶg͟ Hosp16 
 ͞‘elatiǀes of a patieŶt oŶ end of life care and on s/c morphine pump have made allegations 
that the patient was murdered by nursing staff. He died about 45 minutes after a prn dose of 
ŵoƌphiŶe foƌ distƌess. PoliĐe atteŶded the ǁaƌd at the ƌeƋuest of the faŵilǇ.͟ Acut63 
The five reported allegations of unprofessional behavior were all upheld and resulted in disciplinary 
action.  Police investigation of the six reports of potentially hastened death did not result in any 
further action being taken. 
 
Disturbed dying 
Reports categorised as ͞distuƌďed dǇiŶg͟ ƌelated to eǀeŶts at the ŵoŵeŶt of, oƌ iŵŵediatelǇ afteƌ a 
patieŶt͛s death that did Ŷot fit iŶto otheƌ Đategoƌies. TheǇ aƌose fƌoŵ all Đaƌe settiŶgs otheƌ thaŶ 
acute hospital units.  
 
Most such reports from an institutional setting were associated with failures to plan care, including 
unclear goals of care and failures to document advance care planning. Harmful consequences 
included patients dying during the process of attempted transfer to hospital, attempts at 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation when this was not clinically appropriate, and distress in bereavement 
from unnecessary involvement of the police or coroner following expected deaths; for example: 
͞… a patient was hypoglycaemic and unresponsive. The patient was not for resuscitation. The 
paramedics took the patient to A&E... The patient died in the corridor on the stretcher ...͟ 
Nurs12 
Ten reports were associated with failures in care delivery and coordination with poor interagency 
working and handover in seven of the ten cases, for example: 
͞TeƌŵiŶallǇ ill patieŶt disĐhaƌged fƌoŵ [aĐute hospital ǁaƌd Ŷaŵe] ǁithout ďeiŶg ƌefeƌƌed to 
DN [distƌiĐt ŶuƌsiŶg] seƌǀiĐe. PatieŶt died oŶ flooƌ at hoŵe the Ŷeǆt daǇ.͟ Home10 
Reports of distuƌďed dǇiŶg iŶ a patieŶt͛s oǁŶ hoŵe ;thƌee ĐasesͿ ǁeƌe assoĐiated ǁith delaǇs iŶ Đaƌe 
during an out-of-hours period leading to poor symptom management; for example:  
͞Daughteƌ has ƌepoƌted that she tƌied to ĐoŶtaĐt DistƌiĐt Nuƌses aŶd Out-of-hours GP and 
PaƌaŵediĐs to get soŵe paiŶ ƌelief foƌ heƌ ŵotheƌ, ďut heƌ ŵotheƌ ĐoŶtiŶued to ďe iŶ paiŶ.͟ 
Home82 
The relative had recognised the need to escalate care but was unable to access out-of-hours care 
provision this led to patients dying in pain. 
 
Other causes of disturbed dying included suicide and unnecessary police or coronial involvement. 
Five suicides and one attempted suicide were reported. In one of these cases a shortfall in care was 
identified by the reporter: 
͚The ŵediĐal aŶd ŶuƌsiŶg assessment of [the patient] did not indicate a patient with suicidal 
ideatioŶ; hoǁeǀeƌ this ǁas appaƌeŶtlǇ a ĐoŶĐeƌŶ of the MaĐMillaŶ Ŷuƌse …. CoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ 
ďetǁeeŶ the AĐute teaŵ aŶd the MaĐŵillaŶ Ŷuƌse heƌe leaǀes ƌooŵ foƌ iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶt.͛ 
Acut95 
The police or coroner were involved following the death of the patient in 69 cases (39 (57%) were 
dƌug iŶĐideŶtsͿ although the outĐoŵe ǁas ofteŶ Ŷot ƌeĐoƌded. CoƌoŶeƌs͛ iŶǀolǀeŵeŶt fƌeƋueŶtlǇ led 
to distressing delays in funeral arrangements being described. Early contact and discussion of the 
case with the coroner by a member of the clinical team usually pre-empted the need for a more 
thorough investigation. 
  
Discussion 
 
We believe that our study is the first to empirically examine all reports received by a national 
reporting system of serious incidents occurring during the provision of palliative care.  The 
population studied encompassed a range of conditions, both malignant and non-malignant, a range 
of settings and both specialist and non-specialist palliative care providers. The reports demonstrated 
harm arising from a combination of shortfalls in the standards and provision of care and the intrinsic 
vulnerability of this patient population. 
 
Pressure ulcers were the commonest category of incident identified in our study and this is 
consistent with previous research in palliative care populations.17-19 Others have rightly challenged 
the application of generic standards and quality markers, such as pressure ulcer avoidance, to a 
palliative care setting because of the altered goals of treatment compared to non-palliative settings.7 
To some extent, our study supports this view; we found pressure ulcer-related harm in dying 
patients, despite excellent care where shared decision making led to pressure relieving measures not 
being applied in order to align management plans with patient priorities. However, pressure ulcers 
aƌe Ŷot just a souƌĐe of paiŶ aŶd disĐoŵfoƌt, theǇ ĐaŶ eƌode a peƌsoŶ͛s digŶitǇ aŶd ŵoƌale. Thus, the 
recognition of altered care goals in palliative care should not be allowed to generate complacency 
and an attitude of passivity emerge regarding pressure sore prevention. Indeed, we found instances 
of uncertainty and assumptions about patients in this population among non-specialist palliative 
care clinical staff leading to oversights in the application of appropriate tools to reduce risk and 
harm.  
 
The extensive use of opioids in palliative care is known to carry risks, at least one prescribing error 
was found in 70% of cases in a prospective series of nearly 200 patients with cancer-related pain 
referred to a specialist palliative medicine service, with multiple errors common.22 Another study 
found prescription errors and medication omissions occurred frequently in a specialist palliative care 
unit.34 Our findings are consistent with this. We also found further vulnerability of palliative care 
patients to medication-related harm due to drug administration errors, particularly when occurring 
close to the moment of death. Nevertheless, concerns in this area must not lead to underuse of 
effective symptom control measures, failure to use opioids and other medications where necessary 
will lead to harm from poor symptom control. Reports of incidents involving syringe drivers in the 
United Kingdom, such as those described in our study, led to guidance in 2010 on the 
standardisation of purchasing of syringe drivers to improve safety,35 interestingly, none of the 
reports concerning syringe drivers included in our study occurred after 2010.  
We termed a group of repoƌts that Đould Ŷot easilǇ ďe Đategoƌized as ͞DisƌuptioŶ to the dǇiŶg 
pƌoĐess͟. Certainty in their final moments is an issue that other qualitative studies have found to be 
important to patients receiving palliative care.14-15 The process of care at the end of life being 
unnecessarily dysfunctional or disrupted was a theme in many reports, for example failure to 
document a plan for death despite it being acknowledged that a patient was at the end of life led to 
inappropriate attempts at transfer to an acute setting and a disturbed dying and bereavement 
process, scenarios that patients receiving palliative care fear.15 A lack of experience in palliative care 
provision, under-resourcing, and poorly coordinated services were underlying themes. These were 
apparently particularly at the interfaces between different care sectors, between acute care 
providers and community providers, both at discharge and admission, for example. 
 
Strengths and limitations 
We believe this to be the first national analysis of patient safety reports focusing on palliative care 
patients. The data capture a cross-section of authentic reporting in a large healthcare system, 
enabling the examination of events and the organisational factors underlying them. Exploring 
problems at a national level, with a mixed methods approach provides insights into the interaction 
of factors between various settings of care delivery that underlie unsafe care.36 
 
All systems of incident reporting, whether in healthcare or other industries, suffer from under-
reporting and the consequent problem of selection bias (i.e. incidents reported may not be typical of 
all that occur).37 It is not possible to comment on variation in underreporting between incident types 
or settings, given the unknown denominator of patient safety incidents occurring to palliative care 
patients; therefore, we cannot comment on the relative safety of different healthcare settings. This 
uncertainty, combined with a lack of a reliable denominator for the number of clinical contacts in 
any given palliative care setting, also makes an estimate of the prevalence of safety incidents 
impossible. However, it is important to note that incident report data provide a considerable body of 
granular information on events and contributory factors perceived to be important by front-line 
healthcare professionals and staff, this means that a qualitative approach alongside any attempts at 
quantification is vital.    
 
 Practical implications 
 
Some of the most influential work in safety has focused on the role of systems in the generation of 
adverse incidents.26 Theƌe is aŶ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg that ͞huŵaŶ faĐtoƌs͟ suĐh as lapses iŶ ŵeŵoƌǇ oƌ 
concentration and errors in execution, such as mis-writing a prescription, are inevitable. Trying to 
eliminate these errors is doomed to failure and so efforts to improve safety have concentrated on 
strengthening the systems workers operate within and creating means by which the adverse 
influence of human factors can be mitigated.38 Our study demonstrates the role of the system in the 
generation of safety incidents during palliative care, revealing models of care that are disjointed, 
poorly coordinated and unable to provide vital medication, equipment or personnel, particularly out 
of hours and in the community. Even where individual care-giǀeƌs͛ aĐtioŶs ǁeƌe the appaƌeŶt Đause 
of an incident, these errors occurred in a system unsupportive of individual clinicians that required 
them to practice in unfamiliar areas using inconsistent equipment. 
 
Those responsible for the management of palliative care provision should ensure that the systems of 
care they oversee are adequately integrated in order to provide continuing care as patients pass 
between providers.  Local healthcare leaders must give strong and visible commitment to patient 
safety. This should include specialist support for palliative care, not just in direct delivery but also in 
offering training and advice for non-specialists who also provide palliative treatment, for example in 
the appropriateness of modifying standard patterns of care in palliative situations and advance 
planning for anticipated dying.  This requires the development of systems of care that are well 
coordinated and able to provide vital medication, equipment or personnel, including out-of-hours 
and in patieŶts͛ oǁŶ hoŵes. DoiŶg so ǁill help assuƌe the safetǇ of ŵaŶǇ patieŶts ǁho aƌe ĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ 
inadvertently harmed by the care that they receive. 
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